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The following article was originally published as a chapter in
Professor Vining's latest book, The Authoritative and the
Authoritarian, University of Chicago Press, 1986. O Reprinted by permission,
The Mute Re! -.tof Description
How would we go about doing legal analysis if
Supreme Court opinions came to resemble the opinions issued by a bureaucratic organization such as the
Interstate Comrnerke Commission?To answer this
question we must ask what lawyers think they are doing when they construct an authoritative statement of
law. That is a question of methodology -what the
method of legal analysis can be said to be -and to understand it fully we must look at the connections and
distinctions between lawyers and the practitioners of
other disciplines.
Legal analysts, by and large, no longer think they
are engaged in a scientific enterprise in the tradition of
the mathematical and physical sciences. This was once
the dominant professed conception, and we still live in
its shadow. The central building in the monumental
law complex at The University of Michigan, begun in
the 1920s, is named the Le a1 Research Building. The
central building at Harvar Law School is Langdell
Hall,named for the late nineteenth-century Dean
whose legacy to American legal education was the
proposition that the utterances of judges were raw
data from which law might be objectively induced as
laws of science might be induced from the data presented by nature. Lawyers are still taught from descendants of the casebooksintroduced by those who

j

,

pro~agatedthe scientific metaphor. The American
Law Institute, established to carry out the scientificenterprise by restating the law in a formulaic way, with
its condensed black-letter taking the place of the pregnant equations of physics, still functions.
And yet it is all only a shadow. None but the benighted believes in the method. To take one small example, an assertion that this one formulation is the
"majority" rule followed by more than 50 percent of
state or federal courts, but that other is the "minoriy
rule, does not move a modem student to say the
"majority rule" is the law. In fact, from its very beginning the method was pretense. The casebooks and
treatises emphasized the opinions of some judges and
not others; they reflected the law of chosen jurisdic
tions, notably Massachusetts, New York, and England. Was one to treat as equivalent an opinion of
Holmes in Massachusettsand an opinion of what'shis-name in Wyoming? Of course not. Some judges
spoke truer doctrine thanothers, a New York opinion
on a commercial matter had more weight than one
from Maine. The opinions themselves were presented
in heavily edited form. A person seeking to state the
law did not in fact go about finding it empirically.
Claims about the method of social science, however,
are still very much with us. It was an early and
enthusiastic vision of a science of society that first influenced legal thinking and legal thinking, like the
ocean, retains the heat of an idea longer than the
atmosphere aroupld it. In contrast to the nineteenthcentury view of the divination of law as a science. social science turns from what lawyers and judges say
and therefore from analysis of doctrine, and looks instead to what judges and other officials do, to behavior

and patterns of behavior, with discovery of correlations leading to assertions of causality. Partly as a result of the scientific ethos generally, partly as a result
of the realist movement in law particularly and the
recognition of what is called administrative law

Claims about the method of social science,
however, are still very much with us. It was
an early and enthusiastic vision of a science of
society that first influenced legal thinking;
and legal thinking, like the ocean, retains the
heat of an idea longer than the atmosphere
around it.

(emanating from official agencies in addition to courts
and legislatures), lawyers today all act as naturalists
or positivists from time to time, and with some
conviction.
A strain of this can be found in the old common law.
Students are told at the very beginning of traditional
legal training that in analyzing a case a distinction
should be drawn between what the judge says and
what the judge does. What he says can be put aside if
it is not necessary to what he does. It is then idle talk,
speculation. There are, as might be expected, enormous difficulties in establishmg criteria for determining necessity and even what exactly it is that the judge
does. There is also a core of psychological truth in
treating as more seriously reflective of actual belief the
making of decisions that have perceptible consequences. But I shall not go further into this aspect of

With friends we pay attention to what they
say as well as what they do With enemies,
on the other hand, we look only to what
they do, and treat what they say as something
that they are doing.

...

common-law analysis. I want only to note it, to recall
how familiar the distinction is toward which such
analysis tries to point, and upon which the standard
method of social science is built. It is the distinction between speaking and acting.
The distinction as we know it in ordinary life is most
vividly perceived in the difference between a friend

and an enemy. With friends we pay attention to what
they say as well as what they do. The phrase that so
often comes to mind of the agonized parent, and that
is sometimes said out loud to everyone's embarrassment, "This hurts me more than it hurts you," is not
always a lie. With enemies, on the other hand, we look
only to what they do, and treat what they say as something that they are doing. We assume that their language is strategic, not authentic, their words counters
in a game like a boxer's banter in the ring, and that the
only pressure within them toward truthfulness is their
fear of getting caught and losing the credibility that
makes possible successful distortion and omission.
Disentangled from the experience of everyday life
and raised to the level of theory or method, the distinction is that between nature and man, that between the
outside and the inside, and, to a large degree, that between what is obiective and what is not.
Teachers, schdars, and practitioners of law often
consider themselves social scientists when they do not
take at face value what a judge says and instead ask
what is really going on. But an interest in the actual
and the real, in what is really going on, does not make
one necessarily a scientist. When in search of law one
asks, "What does this sveaker reallv mean?" one has
not crossed the Line betbeen man &d nature. When
one speaks in causal terms and asks "What caused this
speaker to say what he said?" one has crossed that
line. And for the lawyer it is a most dangerous line to
cross. Once over it, we know, the lawyer is in danger
of being picked up and swept bumpety-bump over the
horizon and into a breakfast theory of justice - the
theory of the 1930s that what a judge does is determined by what breakfast he eats in the morning.
When at the end of one's search for law one finds oneself deposited in a small white room staring at a fried
egg, one has the choice of giving up the enterprise, for
one really has nothing useful or interesting to say and
no one to say it to; or one can come out of the room
and creep back to one's fellows.
One might think, however, that one could go outside and cross the line without exposing oneself to the
risk of that lonely little room, if one confined oneself to
description. Although description is the first step in
scientific analysis, it does not necessarily involve the
pursuit of causes that carry us away. o n e can say to a
friend, "Look at what you are doing to yourself," without going on and saying, "You are doing this because of
this and that and the other;" one can say, "Let me describe this painting or this piece of music to you,"
without undertaking to explain it away.
But when we describe we make implicit causal statements, at least in the sense that we describe something
rather than everything: we draw a line around that
which we focus our attention upon. A painting has a
frame around it. A piece of music has a beginning and
an end in time. Within the thing we are describing and
have drawn a line around, there is a hanging together
of parts and pieces because they are connected in some

fashion. They are organized into the entity to which
we point. They have been given structure. In any good
description one can see the parts pushing this way and
that and resulting in a perceivable form, rather as one
can see the parts of a skyscraper pushing this way and
that to produce the skyscraper and continuously cause
it to be a skyscraper and a thing that can be described.
In the course of legal analysis we certainly do describe. Careful, exhaustive description is part of legal
method. Just think how rich a cultural, social, historical, and economic context lawyers build up around a
case if they are trying to draw law from it in a way that
will excite the professional admiration of their colleagues. Felix Frankfurter's early course in administrative law, which was called Public Utilities, was nicknamed the Case-of-the-Month Club. American law
students are amazed at how much time a contracts
professor can spend on Hadley v. Baxendale, an English
decision of 1854. The working over of cases in questions from the bench, the memoranda of clerks to their
judges, and the arguments in good briefs may be more
in the way of sketches of such full analysis, owing to
limits of space and time, but their object is the same.
Good lawyers today are all practitioners of sociologcal
jurisprudence. Exhaustive investigation and description, as the product of an urge, indeed a necessity to
know what is really going on if we are to engage in
legal analysis, does give the study of law a kinshp
with science.
So, if we want to know what the law of probation is
in an American jurisdiction, we go beyond conclusory
judicial statements about public safety and dangerousness, and examine what factors are being taken into
account in decisions to grant probation or to institutionalize juveniles or convicts. If we want to know

The difficulty in saying that description and
perception of process is all, or even the major
part, of legal analysis is that when we are
done we have nothing that need be obeyed,
nothing that we need respect.

what the law is in a field regulated by an administrative agency, we are instructed by the Administrative
Procedure Act not to limit ourselves to the rules the
agency has designated as the law, but to examine also
the internal policies and guidelines that organize the
agency and govern the decisions of agency officials.
Those, too, are defined as agency rules. In short,
we see sources of law as systems. As we explore, investigate, probe, collect, categorize, and arrange the

data, we more and more have before us a process, a set
of moving relationshps that form a pattern; and with
the process brought out and set down on paper, the
legal products - the texts and statements to which
our attention is initially directed -become parts of the
process, outcomes of the process. The decisions and
the statements of rules become, in a way, transparent,
as a living cell becomes transparent upon investigation, and what we see instead is a system, a structure
-as if we were scientists of a descriptive bent.
But here again we are in terrible difficulty, not quite
so severe or quite so obvious as if we were to be presented with a fried egg whenever we asked for law,
but severe enough.,The difficulty in saying that description and perception of process is all, or even the
major part, of legal analysis is that when we are done
we have nothing that need be obeyed, nothing that we
need respect. What we have discovered to be really
going on has no authority over us, and for the same
reason that nature has no authority over us. Since
we have from the first been searching for what is
authoritative and to be obeyed, we cannot say that
we have found the law at all.
The Authority of Nature
It may not be self-evident that nature has no authority over us. Of course nature has authority over us, you
may say. It has the most powerful authority of all. We
are physically limited, mentally structured. Our passions rise in us despite ourselves. The art of happiness
consists in the acceptance of these limitations and
these drives, our sexual nature and our social nature
particularly. How can it be said that nature has no authority over us? Why, nature has the only authority
over us that we must accept.
In truth, however, when we accept, let us say, the
sexual part of ourselves, and feel we ourselves are at
the center of it rather than it outside us and we the victims or playthings of it, then we have to that extent
transcended nature. You cannot be the slave of your
passions, for if you felt that, they would not be your
passions. We need not accept the sexual urge, and insofar as men and women do not accept it and fight and
struggle against it, it is something apart from them,
over and against them, a cause they can resist, manipulate, and trick, with cold baths and repression.
We never accept the limitations of time and space. We
have no wings, but we want to fly. We steady the body
against old age. We seek to escape in art the rush of
time. The nature we think of as good and an extension
of ourselves is just that, an extension of ourselves. The
authority of beauty is the authority of our own perceptions. We could say that a row of hills is not beautiful when in fact we felt it was, but we would not be
disobeying any command or even disassociating ourselves from the object that had enthralled us.
Nature is sometimes said to be that which we actually do. But what we actually do is not what we must

do: our entire effort over centuries may be directed
against what we actually do. What we must do is not
what we ought to do or want to do. Again, our entire
effort may be directed against what, for the time being,
we must do. For, really, we do not know our limits.
Nature, real nature, about which we have no say, does
not, in itself, have legitimacy or justify what we do or
fail to do. Nature, that wluch is, just goes on.
-1have called the-difference between nature and man
the difference between an enemy and a friend, and
this though I myself love nature in one sense, love its
colors, its warmth, its music and its light. But I believe,
when I say I love nature, that I personify and create.
When it is sunny and we are happy we feel at one with

Nature will go on its own way regardless of
our cry, unless, of course, we force it to do

nature and embrace it. But when it is gray we may resist it, and often do. I would not put myself in the
hands of nature, and neither would you. Nature will
go on its own way regardless of our cry, unless, of
course, we force it to do otherwise.
Natural laws are nothing to be obeyed or respected.
Quite the reverse. In natural science results are not
right or wrong. They are just results. What is observed, what is done, behavior -here I do not say
"what is chosen," "decided," or "said," for such anthropomorphic terms cannot be used in natural science
except in a fanciful way -is never unlawful or against
scientific law. Results are the sovereign. If they are inconsistent with scientific law, the law is changed to
eliminate the inconsistency, or elaborated to explain
the inconsistency (and thus make it no inconsistency
at all) by adding additional variables that had not been
thought of before or included in the rule. If the very
perception of a result is tied to a concept that has no
existing place in scientific thought, the result may be
put aside and ignored, or not perceived; but it may
precipitate a change that is not in form an elaboration,
rather a move toward apparent simplicity. The newly
stated rule or the more elaborate rule (or collection of
proliferated subrules) then becomes the scientific law,
which remains until new results come in which falsify
the statement. Natural laws are not even addressed to
that which they are said - again fancifully - to govern, and the joy of the practicing scientist is pitting
himself against them.
Consider again the search for law through description, as that technique is practiced upon nature.
In examining how the American criminal justice system really works, the student today looks at that vast

bulk of its workings which take place before and after
the criminal trial. Indeed, when one views the criminal
justice system as a system, a trial and conviction of
substantive crime is largely a jurisdictional event: it
does not determine what actually happens to anyone.
If there is a trial, what the trial is about - what facts
and substantive law are involved in it -is determined
by an administrative process through which some particular criminal charge is chosen. Whether there is a trial at all - that is, whether the mode by which jurisdiction over a defendant's life is obtained is trial rather
than conviction by guilty plea - is determined by an
administrative process in which prosecutor and defense attorney participate and a large number of factors, including the cost and time of a trial, are taken
into account. After conviction, sentencing is entirely
administrative, with prosecutors, probation officers,
and judges acting as administrative officials. If sentence is not suspended, further decisions are made
administratively by probation officers, prison officials,
and parole boards, with judges engaged in some
judicial review of all these various decisions and, if
necessary, in their ultimate enforcement. Where is the
law in all this? How does one go about finding it and
stating it? By what technique, what methods?
Suppose you examine the records carefully, putting
one sentencing case with another, and discover that
in a particular district all judges take into account
whether a young girl smokes cigarettes in deciding
whether to grant or revoke probation. You might induce a rule that young girls on probation may not
smoke. This rule can be restated as a practical rule that
at least some young girls who smoke may or will be
jailed for smolung. Is this the law?

Natural laws are not even addressed to that
which they are said - again fancifully -to
govern, and the joy of the practicing scientist
is pitting himself against them.

The same problem arises in the perennial attempt to
define what administrative law is. The question with
which scholars and compilers of casebooks constantly
wrestle is how far administrative law is to be treated
as a study of doctrine, and how far it is to be treated as
a study of the way administrative agencies go about
,makingpolicy and decisions. As the description of
an administrative system increases in detail and
sophistication, more and more prominence is gven to
the daily interaction between the agency and organized parts of its regulatory field - consumer groups,
industry, professional societies, and the like - and to

the frequent bargaining with congressional oversight
committees, figures in Congress who influence agency
budgets, higher officials within government departments who set priorities, the Office of Management
and Budget, and special task forces on the president's
staff. A practitioner seeking to guide a client and predict how an agency will behave will want to know
these things. The legal scholar seeking to know what
is really going on must likewise have a good sense
of these things. But suppose it is discovered that the
Environmental Protection Agency issues a rule taking
into account the larger budgetary hopes of the agency
after discussions with White House staff and members
of Congress in which industry and other group representatives have been deeply involved. Can we say it is
the law that, pursuant to the governing environmental
statute, there is to be lower air quality if the next
budget of the Environmental Protection Agency would
be improved thereby? Do we not lose anything that
we can identify as law or teach as law as we penetrate
deeper and deeper into system and process? The line
between law and policy fades, and then the line
between policy and politics fades too.
Laughter, Seriousness, and Authority
We search for law, for the legitimate. The legitimate
is authoritative. It can order us, order our minds and
our actions. This word "order" has at least two connotations which, in our inherited language, are joined
together for a very good reason. What cannot speak to
us cannot order us. If it does not order us we will not
obey. It is not that we will disobey. It is just that obedience and disobedience do not enter into the situation
at all. We may adapt, go along just so long as we have
to, in the same way that a walker coming to a river is
led by the river along its winding bank, the way the
river is going and not the way the walker wants to go.
The river gives no order to the walker to change his
course, and the walker does not think the river has any
authority over him. The river just is, at least for the
time being, until a ford is reached. The difference can
perhaps be brought home to lawyers by recalling the
first of the choices they face, which is met with every
day in the practice of law.
There are two attitudes toward a command, and the
choice between them is always open to lawyers and
their clients. One possibility is to take the command
into account in good faith when making decisions. The
other is not to take the command into account except
insofar as we are forced to or it is convenient and good
strategy to do so. The one partakes of faith. The other
is to pursue our various ends to gain whatever advantage we can until a superior force comes after us and
makes us stop. The one is active, the other passive: we
can take the initiative with respect to the purpose and
sense of the command, or we can shift the burden of
initiative to those seeking to affect our behavior, and

use the advantages of delay and congestion that two of
the givens of existence, namely, the passage of time
and the limits of space, always hold out to us. We externalize the command, or we can internahze it, with
large practical consequences for the everyday conduct
of affairs, as everybody well knows. An organization
which is alive and whose members are full of morale is
infused with the one attitude and goes forward rapidly
toward its goals. An organization that is dead or dylng
and whose members are disengaged and estranged is
marked by the other attitude. I suggest that when we
search for the law, what we find is the law -or it is
not - depending upon which attitude it evokes in us:
faith, activity, and life -or their fearful opposites.
Consider our reactions to computers and other complex machines that enter our lives. The touch-tone dialing system uses music (or at least tones in sequence)
to convey information to its vast and complex control
center. We are often presented such a place in television advertisements. It is a room filled with whirring
wheels and blinking lights, and we are shown, as a
painting by Magritte, the backs of the heads of human
beings who face, as we do, the banks of machinery. At
a telephone in a dimly lit college dormitory a student
with a panpipe plays a little tune which gains him entry to the system and a free call to a friend three

What is the common attitude toward a
fulminating computer creditor? What is
yours? Do you pay attention as you wouldto
the pleas or commands of a person?

thousand miles away. The student has the key to the
system. He knows its secret. What is the common attitude toward the student and what he has managed to
do? What is your attitude, really? Is there not an element of delight in it, just a little desire to applaud?
Does it immediately seem to you that he is a thief?
When we do not pay our credit card bills exactly on
time, a computer begins to speak to us. Messages are
printed out on subsequent bills, beginning with gentle
reminders and then becoming more ominous as time
goes on, with words like "please," "appreciate," and
"thank you" progressively deleted, until finally sharp
threats are made in a personal letter addressed to us in
a separate envelope -just before we send our check.
What is the common attitude toward a fulminating
computer creditor? What is yours? Do you pay attention as you would to the pleas or commands of a person? Do you warm to the politeness and concern expressed in the early messages, quiver at the sternness

and threats programmed into the last? Do you feel
badly that the computer had to print out a special personal letter to you? Are you moved, or do you look to
your convenience, affected only by the thought that at
some point the computer may put a black mark on
your credit rating for tardy payment?
Or consider the phenomenon of cheating on computer administered examinations. A large part of a recent
graduating class at a prominent graduate professional
school took advantage of a defect in the.programming
of a nutrition test. For each student, the computer was
to select 40 out of 350 questions, flashing them on the
screen one by one, and the student was to respond by

Are you moved, or do you look to your convenience, affected only by the thougkt that at
some point the computer may put a black
mark on your credit rating for tardy payment?

punching in the answer. At the end of the test the
computer flashed the student's grade and then stored
the grade in its memory. The system had a feature that
allowed the student to skip a question, as he might on
a written test, and come back to it later. The computer
was to flash the question again at a later time. Unfortunately the computer was programmed to forget
the questions skipped and postponed by the student,
and, moreover, not to count them in tallylng the percentage answered correctly. Any clever student, who
could draw the proper inferences from reports of the
computer's behavior casually dropped by students
who had taken the test, was in a position to go in, start
skipping questions untd he came to one he knew he
could answer, answer that, skip all the rest, and then
ask for h s grade, which would be a perfect score.
When the error was discovered - there had been
an astonishingly large number of high grades -the
school administration &d not simply reprogram the
computer and give the test again. It invoked the honor
code and accused the students of doing something
wrong, of cheating. Many students responded that
there was nothing wrong with using ingenuity to beat
a computer. The school, they said, was simply punishing them for its own sloppy computer programming.
And to the administrator's horror, some parents called
up to defend their children, saying they had all had a
good laugh about it.
Laughter. What was done was considered to be no
more than beating a machine, the dean lamented.
None of this is really hard to understand. You need
only ask whether your own sense of honesty, when
you encounter mistakes or inconsistencies in pricing,
feels a bit more unmoored in a large supermarket than

in a small comer store. In all these instances, there is a
loss of the sense of obligation. In all of them, individuals are dealing, or sense they are dealing, with a
mindless system.
In some cases the designer of the system can be conceived as standing behind it. But it is a strlking feature
of machines in the modern world - particulary those
to which intelligence is attributed - that they stand
independent of their creators. From the time of Mary
Shelley and Frankenstein the very attribution of intelligence to machines, whether or not it is correct, has
resulted in this independence. Moreover, when the
system is not given the attributes of intelligence and
a designer can be conceived standing behind it, the
designer is often not a person who cares about those
the system is affecting. There is an observable difference in the attitude even of the young toward a system
of training, obstacles, and tests set up for them by a
coach, and their attitude toward the other systems and

But what we truly see as a system, whose
existence can be set out for us exhaustively
through the technique of description alone,
can make no claim at all upon our behavior.

processes in which they are enmeshed. In the case of
the long-distance telephone, the telephone company
behind the system is profit-maximizing, or is thought
to be. In the case of the school that creates a testing
machine there is some ambiguity, and this, I should
suppose, is what produces the difficulty in deciding
whether beating that system is wrong. But what we
truly see as a system, whose existence can be set out
for us exhaustively through the technique of description alone, can make no claim at all upon our behavior.
A system can demand no trust from you. You cannot trust a system. A system will not look out for you
or be concerned about the consequences of its operations for you. So long as it is just a system, it cannot. Outcomes, results, effects, for a system, just are.
You cannot let down your defenses, put yourself into
its hands, go along with it, any more than you can let
down your defenses and go along with a chemical
reaction or invite an unknown gas to join you behind
your scuba diving mask. It will come in if you let it and
do what it must do, and it may possibly not come in if
you do not let it. A system does not pity you, and you
do not pity a system. You observe it, and wait. A system will not respond if you cry out to it. It cannot hear
you. Nor can it cry out to you. It cannot speak. You do
not seek to persuade a system to do anything: you
punch it, punch into it, put something into it. Obeying
would be as foolish as the opposite, getting angry and

kicking the machine. No feeling is in place when facing
a system, a process, a machine, save the one feeling
of coolness -which is absence of warmth, of life, of
being inside. No emotion is appropriate in your
relation with it - nothing of that from which man's
motion comes.
And if a system consists of words -instead of
musical tones, wires, prices, or radar signals the situation is not different. Words themselves
cannot speak. E l
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